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Abstract: This study is based on the high levels of corruption occurring in Indonesia, indicated by the low 
level of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The majority of corruption cases occurring in Indonesia 
involves local governmental institutions. The high levels of corruption in local governments is related to 
government size, fiscal decentralization, and audit findings. The aim of this study is to determine the factors 
that cause the high levels of corruption in local governments. This study uses the agency theory as theoretical 
basis to formulate a framework of thought that connects government size, fiscal decentralization, audit 
findings, and corruption levels. The result of this study shows that the variables of government size, fiscal 
decentralization, audit findings, all have significant effects towards corruption levels. Fiscal decentralization 
and audit findings have a negative effect towards corruption level, while the government size variable has a 
positive effect on corruption levels. This study provides contribution to the practices of auditing, government 
execution, law enforcement, and corruption control initiatives in local governments in Indonesia. 
 




Corruption is one of the issues in developing countries (Olken, 2007). The practice of corruption in 
government bodies causes the decrease of governmental performance in managing resources, decrease of 
national revenue from the tax sector, the distortion of public expenditure, and the decrease of public 
infrastructure quality. The final effect of the chain caused by the practice of corruption is revenue 
discrepancy, and poverty (Mauro, 1995). The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), released by the 
Transparency International (TI) organization is one of the instruments to measure the success of a country in 
handling and eradicating cases of corruption. The lower the rate of corruption cases in a country, the higher 
the CPI score obtained, and vice versa. Countries with a stable economic condition tend to have a higher CPI 
score compared to developing countries. This is due to the fact that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an 
influencing factor in predicting corruption in a country (Bernaldez, 2014). Indonesia ranks 85 out of 180 
countries, with a CPI score of 40 points (Transparancy International, 2019). This score represents a relatively 
high level of corruption cases in Indonesia. However, there have been improvements with regards to 
regulation, decentralization, and law enforcement supremacy that have been implemented since the 
institutional reformation at the end of the 1990s, which caused economic and political crisis in Indonesia. 
This event drove Indonesia to become more democratic, decentralized, and regulated (Henderson & Kuncoro, 
2011). 
 
Figure 1: Number of Corruption Cases Based on Institution 
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During 2018, a total of 199 cases of corruption spread across governmental institutions occurred. The 
Commission for Corruption Eradication categorizes this corruption case data based on governmental 
institutions, as shown in Figure 1. The data shows that the governmental institution with the highest 
prevalence of corruption cases are district/city local governments. Anan (2019) stated that decentralization 
is one of the causes of the high levels of corruption in local governments of Indonesia. Previous studies have 
also shown that fiscal decentralization has a significant effect towards corruption levels (Anan, 2019; Dong & 
Torgler, 2013; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). On the other hand, decentralization is one of the instruments to combat 
practices of corruption. Fiscal decentralization creates a more accountable and responsive government 
practice towards the condition of the region’s people.(Changwony & Paterson, 2019; Faguet, 2014; Shah, 
2006). This statement is supported by the research findings of Aswar dan Surbakti (2013), which states that 
the implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia helps in decreasing discrepancies between regions, 
since its mechanism aids local governments in managing resources according to the needs of the people in the 
region. Another study also found that fiscal decentralization can also increase the quality of the government 
in regards to corruption management, law supremacy, and government effectivity (Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés, 
2011; Mello & Barenstein, 2001). Suhardjanto, Syafruddin, Andini and Rahmatika (2018) state that the 
implementation of decentralization.  
 
In Indonesia provides opportunity for the practice of corruption through the misuse of authority by people 
with power, in both small and large governments. A previous study showed that government size significantly 
affects corruption levels (Blackburn, Bose, & Emranul Haque, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 1998; Magtulis & Poquiz, 
2017). The size of the government can be viewed from the size of intervention done by the country through 
the budget (Magtulis & Poquiz, 2017). However, the size of budget intervention can affect the high rates of 
corruption if not accompanied with strict monitoring. This is due to the fact that government officials often 
times benefit from the loophole of budget intervention through public expenditure, in order to practice 
corruption (Ko & Zhi, 2013; Zhao & Xu, 2015). Another previous study also shows that government size 
affects the level of corruption in a region (Goel & Nelson, 1998; Liu & Lin, 2012). The lack of monitoring and 
governance becomes the cause of the prevalence of corruption in the public sector (Olken, 2007). To prevent 
cases of corruption in local governments, there needs to be monitoring done by the central government 
towards local governments (Suhardjanto et al., 2018). The National Audit Board (BPK) is the institution that 
is responsible to conduct examinations to ensure that a governmental institution manages resources with 
proper accountability, based on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 15 Year 2006 on 
the National Audit Board. Examinations conducted by governmental audit institutions become the indicator 
of the transparency and accountability level of governmental institutions (Suhardjanto et al., 2018). 
 
Auditing institutions guarantee the quality and availability of information provided by the government 
(Brusca, Manes Rossi, & Aversano, 2018; Hameed, 2005). Furthermore, the examination mechanism 
implemented by the audit institution based on information accuracy and the prevention of financial misuse, 
enables the audit institution to detect fraud in the government (Brusca et al., 2018; Liu & Lin, 2012; Olken, 
2007). A proper audit process can decrease the level of corruption in the public sector (Gustavson & 
Sundström, 2018). Ferraz and Finan (2011) state that, when audit institutions work independently and 
objectively, then deviations or violation cases reported to the audit institution can indicate the presence of 
corruption practices in the government. Frauds detected during the audit process are reported in the form of 
audit findings (Liu & Lin, 2012; Suhardjanto et al., 2018). More audit findings show a low level of 
accountability, and potentially causes corruption (BPK, 2019). A previous study also found that audit findings 
has a significant effect towards corruption levels (Liu & Lin, 2012; Suhardjanto et al., 2018). This study 
provides literary contribution by adding the variable of audit findings as an indicator of the weakness of 
internal control systems, and obedience towards regulations, according to the recommendation of the study 
conducted by Adedeji, Soyinka and Sunday (2018). The study recommended the use of obedience towards 
shared regulations, and internal control, to control corruption. Besides theoretical benefits, this study also 
provides several wide implications for the practice of auditing, government practices, law enforcement, and 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Agency Theory:  The agency theory discusses the agency relationship and agency costs that occur in the 
relationship between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency theory assumes that a 
person who prioritizes their own interest shows the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corruption can be defined as a behavior that does not follow the principal, done 
by the agent, by private sectors or public officials (Tanzi, 1994). In the public sector, cases of corruption occur 
due to the misuse of resources by parties from the government, for personal use. This can occur due to the 
difference in interest and motivation between two parties, as well as asymmetry of information (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Blackburn et al. (2006) states that the delegation of authority in government transactions causes an 
agency problem that can cause corruption practices. The formation of audit institutions in the government is 
aimed to implement monitoring towards the performance of the agent, and works to mitigate agency 
problems that occur in the public sector (Hay & Cordery, 2018; Aswar, 2019). A previous study also used the 
agency theory as the theoretical basis to form a conceptual framework, in a research related to sector public 
audit and corruption levels (Avis, Ferraz, & Finan, 2018; Brusca et al., 2018; Ferraz & Finan, 2011; Hay & 
Cordery, 2018). Aside from this, the agency theory was also the framework basis of the relationship between 
government practices and levels of corruption (Blackburn et al., 2006; Magtulis & Poquiz, 2017; Zhang, 2016). 
In previous literature, many studies have discussed the role of government size in affecting corruption levels. 
 
Focusing on government size, Magtulis and Poquiz (2017) studied the relationship between government size 
and corruption levels in the Philippines using the auto regression vector. The result of this study did not find 
a causal relationship between the two research variables, since the perception of corruption can affect the 
other three control variables. The result of the study showed that a larger government size will increase the 
perception of the public on corruption. In another study, Ko and Zhi (2013) analyzes the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and corruption levels in local governments in China with moderation from law 
enforcement. The analysis used data from 31 provinces in China from 1998 until 2008, and the investigation 
result supports the importance of strong law enforcement for fiscal decentralization in order to decrease the 
rate of corruption in local governments. Particularly, this study found that law enforcement can moderate the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and levels of corruption. Suhardjanto et al. (2018) studies the 
relationship between audit opinion, audit findings, and audit result follow-up, with the corruption levels in 
local governments of Indonesia. The data analysis process used data from 34 provincial governments from 
2011 until 2015. The result of the study showed that corruption occurs due to a weak monitoring system 
caused by the misuse of authority by government officials. The result of the study also found that lack of 
monitoring can cause disobedience towards laws, and thus cause corruption practices. 
 
Hypothesis and Conceptual Framework: The hypothesis development in this study is based on factors 
suspected to have effects towards levels of corruption, and is thus formulated as follows: 
 
The Effect of Government Size towards Corruption Level: In the context of the agency theory, the 
government size variable is described as the relationship between the central government and local 
government. The central government provides incentives to the local governments in the form of a budget 
that must be managed by the local government. This paradigm is formed due to the fact that the 
measurement of government size is done by measuring the size of intervention done by the country towards 
the budget of the government’s budget (Magtulis & Poquiz, 2017). This measurement causes larger-sized 
governments to increase the provision of public goods, and re-distribute revenue to push development (Goel 
& Nelson, 1998; Zhao & Xu, 2015). Blackburn et al. (2006) stated that the delegation of authority in 
government transactions causes an agency problem, which can result in corruption practices. A previous 
study also showed that the size of responsibility given by the central government affects the level of 
corruption in local governments (Goel & Nelson, 1998; Lecuna, 2012; Liu & Lin, 2012). This is due to the fact 
that government officials benefit from loopholes in the public expenditure policy to practice corruption (Ko & 
Zhi, 2013). Based on theory and previous studies, the researcher formulates the following hypothesis:  
H1: Government size affect corruption level. 
 
The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization towards Corruption Level: Blackburn et al. (2006) stated that the 
delegation of authority by the central government to local governments causes an agency problem, which can 
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result in corruption practice. This statement is supported by a previous study which states that 
decentralization is one of the factors behind the prevalence of corruption in local governments (Anan, 2019; 
Ko & Zhi, 2013). However, Shah (2006) states that decentralization can strengthen public accountability by 
involving the people to monitor the performance of local governments and demand corrective actions, 
including demanding authorized parties to mitigate corruption and its causes. This accountability aids the 
government in its war against corruption practices (Brusca et al., 2018). This statement is also supported by 
the study conducted by Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011), which found that the concept of fiscal 
decentralization enables local governments to become more effective in controlling corruption and law 
enforcement. Another previous study also supports that fiscal decentralization can decrease the amount of 
corruption in a region (Dong & Torgler, 2013; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Mello & Barenstein, 2001; Shah, 2006). 
Based on theory and previous studies, the researcher formulates the following hypothesis:  
H2: Fiscal decentralization affect corruption level. 
 
The Effect of Audit Findings towards Corruption Level:  The delegation of authority and responsibility by 
the central government to local governments can cause an agency problem, which can result in corruption 
practices (Blackburn et al., 2006). Corruption can be defined as an act of disobedience towards the principal, 
done by the agent (Tanzi, 1994). In the public sector, corruption practices often occur due to the issue of 
asymmetry of information and incentives that are explained in the agency theory (Elbahnasawy, 2014). The 
central government attempts to mitigate this asymmetry of information with the formation of an audit 
institution, tasked to monitor the financial performance of agents (Hay & Cordery, 2018). All forms of 
deviations done by the local government during the operational process that is found by the audit institution 
is reported in the audit findings result (Liu & Lin, 2012; Suhardjanto et al., 2018). Deviation findings are 
categorized into two types, which are: findings of weaknesses in the internal control system, and on 
disobediences towards laws. All forms of weaknesses of internal control systems and disobedience towards 
regulations will effect deviating actions which can result in corruption practices (Huefner, 2011). A previous 
study also found the positive correlation between audit findings and level of corruption (Liu & Lin, 2012; 
Suhardjanto et al., 2018). This positive correlation indicates that a large number of audit findings found by 
the government audit institution has an effect in the prevalence of corruption. Based on theory and previous 
studies, the researcher formulates the following hypothesis: 
H3: Audit findings affect corruption level. 
 
Figure 2: Research Framework 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
The population of this study is the district/city governments in Indonesia, which consists of 416 district 
governments and 98 city governments. The district/city governments were selected based on the 
phenomenon of this study, which shows that corruption cases in Indonesia are most prevalent in district/city 
governments. Furthermore, district and city governments are the lowest level of government in the fiscal 
decentralization system in Indonesia. The researcher gathers samples based on criteria that the researcher 
set, from the total population of this study, using the purposive sampling technique. The criteria used in this 
sampling process is as follows: 
a) District/city governments that have corruption cases with legal power, based on the verdict of the national 
court in 2018. 
b) District/city governments that have data of audit result findings reports issued by the National Board of 
Audit of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK RI). 
Government Size 
Audit Findings 
Fiscal Decentralization  Corruption Level 
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c) District/city governments that have complete data for all the variables of this study for the 2018 fiscal year. 
Furthermore, the collection of data for this study was done through publications in the official website and 
electronic communication media of the related institution. The data gathered consists of Local Government 
Financial Reports (LKPD), Examination Result Report (LHP) of the BPK, Corruption Case Reports, Population 
Data, and RGDP Data. This study uses the causal research method. The causal method is used to identify the 
effects of government size, fiscal decentralization, and audit findings towards the corruption level in local 
governments of Indonesia. Each variable in this study has its own measurement, which are adopted from 
previous studies. The methods of variable measurement are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Variable Measurement 
Variable Measurement Source 
Corruption Corruption level is measured using a comparison ratio 
between the number of corruption cases with legal power, 
and the amount of population per 10.000. 
Liu and Lin (2012) 
Government Size Comparison ratio of total local government expenditure to 
the total of Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP)  




Fiscal Decentralization is measured with the ratio of total 




Audit Findings The amount of audit findings on weaknesses in the internal 
control system, and audit findings on disobediences towards 
laws.  
Liu and Lin (2012) 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
The population of this study is 514 district and city governments in Indonesia. The selection of samples used 
the purposive sampling technique. The end samples of this study are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: End Samples of Research 
Criteria Total 
Population 514 
District/city governments that do not have cases of corruption with legal power based on the 
verdict of the national court in 2018 
(368) 
District/city governments that do not have data on the number of audit findings issued by the 
BPK RI  
(3) 
District/city governments that do not have complete data for all the variables of research for the 
2018 fiscal year  
(0) 
Number of samples before outliers 143 
Samples with outliers (35) 
End samples 108 
 
Upon conducting filtering towards the population data of the study as shown in Table 2, the researcher 
conducted an outlier process to obtain consistent research data. Outlier was done using case-wise diagnostics 
using SPSS software, which considers the standard deviation as its reference. Standard deviation is the 
measure of data deviation level from the research data center (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016, hlm. 284). Data 
deviation can be viewed by comparing the standard deviation score to the average score. If the standard 
deviation variable exceeds the score of the average variable, then the data has a low deviation rate, and vice 
versa (Cooper & Schindler, 2013, hlm. 401). Aside from that, outlier is also conducted manually to dispose of 
extreme data in the research data. The number of samples with outlier are 29 district governments and 6 city 
governments. The end samples obtained after conducting outlier is 90 district governments and 18 city 
governments. Furthermore, the researched conducted a series of analysis, which consists of: descriptive 
statistics, and hypothesis testing, using the multiple linear regression method. The process of data analysis 
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was done using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) application. The descriptive statistics of the 
research data is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Corruption Level 108 0,00171 0,21726 0,042325 0,035212 
Government Size 108 0,01501 0,53073 0,118876 0,092151 
Fiscal Decentralization  108 0,00024 0,00294 0,00064 0,000449 
Audit Findings 108 5 24 12,74 3,705 
Valid N (listwise) 108         
 
Based on Table 3, there are 108 end samples. Corruption level has a maximum score of 0.21726, minimum 
score is 0.00171. The standard deviation of corruption level is less than the average score of corruption level, 
which indicates a low level of deviation in the research data. The maximum score of government size is 
0.53073. Meanwhile, the minimum score of government size is 0.01501. The standard deviation of 
government size is less than the average score of government size, which indicates a low level of deviation in 
the research data. Fiscal decentralization has a maximum score of 0.00294. Meanwhile, the minimum score of 
fiscal decentralization is 0.00024. The standard deviation of fiscal decentralization is less than the average 
score of fiscal decentralization, which indicates a low level of deviation in the research data. Furthermore, the 
maximum score of audit findings is 24. Meanwhile, the minimum score of audit findings is 5 audit findings. 
The standard deviation of audit findings is less than the average score of audit findings, which indicates a low 
level of deviation in the research data. The classical assumption test, consisting of the normality test, 
heteroscedasticity test, and multicollinearity test, shows that all classical assumption tests have been fulfilled 
and the double linear regression test can be performed. The hypothesis testing used the multiple linear 
regression test. 
 
Table 4: Result of Multiple Linear Regression 
Model Coefficient T Sig. 
(Constant) 0,031 3,679 0,000 
Government Size (GS) 0,288 13,052 0,000 
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) -15,058 -3,314 0,001 
Audit Findings (AF) -0,001 -1,988 0,049 
R-Square 0.713   
 
The test results in Table 4 show that the value of R-Square obtained is 0.713. This score is the representation 
of the collective effects of Government Size, Fiscal Decentralization, and Audit Findings towards the variable 
of Corruption Level, which is 71.3% out of 100%. Meanwhile, the remainder of 28.7% is affected by other 
variables outside of this study. The regression coefficient value of government size is 0.288 and positive. This 
proves that government size has a positive effect towards corruption level, of 0.288. Government size also has 
a calculated t value of 13.052, or larger than the t table value of 1.983, with a significance rate of less than 
0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis of this study is accepted. The result of this study 
states the existence of a positive and significant effect in the relationship between government size, and 
corruption level. The size of the government can be viewed from the size of budget intervention done by the 
central government towards the local government (Magtulis & Poquiz, 2017). This enables larger-sized 
governments to provide more public needs and revenue distribution well. However, this intervention is often 
misused by government officials through budget discretion, to conduct corruption practices (Zhao & Xu, 
2015). The lack of monitoring towards the budget intervention of the central government becomes one of the 
issues. 
 
Which can result into deviations done by government officials, even though the central government at 
present has formed monitoring institutions and law enforcement institutions in order to prevent cases of 
corruption? The result of this study is in line with a previous study which stated that government size 
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determines the level of corruption (Goel & Nelson, 1998; Lecuna, 2012; Liu & Lin, 2012). However, a different 
result is shown in the study conducted by Magtulis and Poquiz (2017), which showed that a large government 
size does not always correspond with high levels of corruption in the Philippines. The regression coefficient 
value of fiscal decentralization is 15.058 and negative. This proves that fiscal decentralization has a negative 
effect towards corruption level, of -15.058. Fiscal decentralization also has a calculated t value of -3,314, or 
larger than the t table value of 1.983, with a significance rate of less than 0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the second hypothesis of this study is accepted. The result of this study found that there is a negative 
effect in relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption level. The result of this study opposes 
the statement of Blackburn et al. (2006), which stated that delegation of authority in government transactions 
from the central government to local governments causes an agency problem that can cause corruption 
practices. 
 
On the other hand Di Shah (2006) states that decentralization can strengthen public accountability by 
involving the people to monitor the performance of local governments and demand corrective actions, 
including demanding authorized parties to mitigate corruption and its causes. This accountability aids the 
government in its war against corruption practices. This statement is also supported by the study conducted 
by Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés (2011), decentralization can also increase the effectivity of the government in 
regards to corruption management, and law enforcement. fiscal decentralization can decrease the amount of 
corruption in a region (Dong & Torgler, 2013; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Mello & Barenstein, 2001; Shah, 2006).  
However, this result is not in line with the findings of Anan (2019), which found that decentralization is one 
of the factors behind the prevalence of corruption in local governments. The regression coefficient value of 
audit findings is 0.001 and negative. This proves that audit findings have a negative effect towards corruption 
level, of -0.001. Audit findings also has a calculated t value of -1.988, or larger than the t table value of 1.983, 
with a significance rate of less than 0.05. Therefore, it can be concluded that the third hypothesis of this study 
is accepted. The result of this study found that there is a negative effect between audit findings and 
corruption level. The result of this study opposes a previous study that found a positive effect. 
 
Between audit findings and corruption level (Liu & Lin, 2012; Suhardjanto et al., 2018). Aside from that, the 
findings of this study is also not in line with the concept of agency theory, which states that audit findings are 
a form of disobedience and deviation done by the agency towards the principal, which can cause losses or 
misuse of resources by the local government (Huefner, 2011). This result difference with previous research 
and inconsistency with the agency theory is due to the fact that the corruption data used by the researcher is 
corruption data that already had legal power in 2018. Meanwhile, not all cases of corruption with legal power 
in 2018 occurred in that same year. This can be cause by cases having only been exposed in 2018, or the 
lengthy legal process taken during the course of the case. Meanwhile, audit findings used were actual findings 
in 2018. However, this difference can be explained by the result findings of a study conducted by Avis et al. 
(2018), which found that local governments that have been audited by audit institutions can decrease the 
level of corruption in the future by as much as 8%. The number of audit findings does not always correspond 
with the high level of corruption in the same period. However, audit findings can become a signal of a weak 
internal control system, and disobedience towards local government laws. If not responded seriously, this can 
become a loophole for corruption practitioners. Therefore, audit findings can also become a preventive step 
to prevent the involvement of corruption practitioners earlier on, and prevent cases of corruption from 
occurring in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Corruption is still a significant issue in Indonesia. This is reflected by the CPI score obtained by Indonesia in 
2018, which is 40 points, despite the fact that the government has published steps to decrease corruption in 
Indonesia, after the political and economic crisis in 1998. This study aims to identify the relationship between 
government size, fiscal decentralization, audit findings, law enforcement, and corruption level in local 
governments in Indonesia. The result of this study found that government size, fiscal decentralization, and 
audit findings, have a significant effect towards the corruption level in Indonesia. This study provides several 
wide implications for the practices of audit, government execution, law enforcement, and the initiative of 
corruption control in the local governments in Indonesia. Keeping in mind that corruption is still an issue in 
Indonesia; the researcher recommends all local governments in Indonesia to practice government 
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transparently and accountably. The implementation of these principles is aimed to be able to decrease the 
corruption level in regions. Local governments are also expected to be able to involve the role of the people to 
aid in monitoring the course of a government that is free from corruption practices. Monitoring must also be 
done by law enforcers, especially those tasked to handle corruption cases. 
 
Law enforcers are expected to be able to monitor and act firmly on corruption practitioners. Therefore, the 
researcher recommends to increase the availability of national court for criminal corruption (PN TIPIKOR) in 
Indonesia. This recommendation is made based on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 
46 Year 2009 on the Corruption Court, which states that the PN TIPIKOR exists in every district/city. At 
present, there are only a total of 33 PN TIPIKOR, which is less than the total number of districts/cities in 
Indonesia, which is 514. There are several limitations experienced by the researcher during the process of 
research. This study is limited to the scope of corruption cases that occur after the reformation. The lack of 
available data caused the researcher to experience difficulty in obtaining data related to cases of corruption 
before the reformation. Aside from that, the scope of this study is only limited to findings from government 
external audit. The next researcher is expected to add the element of government internal audit, and law 
enforcement. Based on findings from the study conducted by Ko and Zhi (2013), the law enforcement variable 
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